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Note 
 
Blocking Blocks at the Border: Examining 
Standard-Essential Patent Litigation Between 
Domestic Companies at the ITC 
Matthew Norris*
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) 
was created to protect domestic industry and American workers 
from illegal foreign trade practices.
 
1 Yet today, the ITC has 
become a hotbed of patent litigation, and consumer access to 
iPads, Xboxes, and other popular electronics produced by 
American companies like Apple and Microsoft hangs in the 
balance simply because these products incorporate required 
technologies.2
                                                                                 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Professor 
Tom Cotter for his advice and guidance in writing this Note. Thanks also to 
Sen. Amy Klobuchar for the opportunity to clerk for the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, where I first encountered this topic, and to Craig Kalkut and 
Sammy Clark for being tremendous mentors throughout the summer. I also 
appreciate the tireless work of my colleagues at the Minnesota Law Review 
who helped whip this Note into shape. Finally, a big thanks to Section A of the 
Class of 2014, with whom I entered this crazy world called law school and with 
whom I will leave having gained so many good friends. Copyright © 2013 by 
Matthew Norris. 
 Increasingly, domestic companies have forced the 
ITC to resolve cases that are contrary to its intended purpose 
by seeking relief for standard-essential patent infringement. 
Instead, these cases should be tried in federal court which is 
 1. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation 
of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 540 (2009) (“Congress created the ITC to gain 
protectionist support for trade reform.”). 
 2. See Paul M. Bartkowski & Evan H. Langdon, Standard-Essential 
Patents: An Increasingly Contentious Issue at the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, CONTEMP. LEGAL NOTES, July 2012, at 1, 2 (“[T]he ITC often 
deals with high-tech consumer electronics subject to standards.”); John 
Ribeiro, ITC Clears Apple of Infringement of Three Motorola Patents, Holds 
Decision on Fourth, PC WORLD (Aug. 26, 2012, 11:50 PM), http://www 
.pcworld.com/article/261464/itc_clears_apple_of_infringement_of_three_ 
motorola_patents_holds_decision_on_fourth.html (reporting that exclusion 
orders for iPhones and Xboxes are pending before the ITC). 
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better suited to resolving these unique intellectual property 
disputes.3
A Microsoft Windows mobile phone, for instance, that could 
only talk to other Windows phones would be largely useless. To 
solve this problem and allow products from different companies 
to work together, standards setting organizations (SSOs) agree 
to certain technical standards, such as 3G which allows 
wireless phones to transmit and receive data.
 
4 Frequently, one 
or more companies have already developed the technology 
needed for the standard and own the patent.5 In exchange for 
having its technology adopted as the standard, the patent 
owner agrees to license this technology to other companies, 
including direct competitors, on reasonable and non-
discriminatory (RAND) terms.6 These patents become known as 
standard-essential patents (SEPs).7 However, this arrangement 
can lead to patent hold-ups when the SEP owner demands 
higher than market rates for using the patent despite its 
commitment to license on RAND terms.8 As a result, some 
competitors will use the SEP without a license, leading to 
patent disputes.9
While patent disputes have traditionally been litigated in 
federal court, makers of high-tech consumer electronics are 
turning to the ITC with increasing frequency to resolve SEP 
 
                                                                                 
 3. See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to 
Enforce Standard-Essential Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 84 (2012) [hereinafter Exclusion Orders] (prepared 
statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (arguing that 
federal district courts have the tools to address this issue). 
 4. 2 STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND 
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 8E:32 (updated by David M. Epstein, 2013). 
 5. See 5 ROBERT A. MATHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 34:53.50 
(2012). 
 6. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32. It is customary for SSOs in the 
United States to use RAND terms while SSOs in other countries or regions 
frequently use fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms or FRAND. See 
Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 96 (prepared statement of Joseph F. 
Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). The two 
terminologies are interchangeable, but since the focus of this Note is on 
domestic industry, RAND will be used throughout for the sake of consistency. 
 7. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testimony Expresses 
Concern that Owners of “Standard-Essential” Patents May Obtain Injunctions 
Enabling Them to Hold Up Other Firms (July 11, 2012), available at http://ftc 
.gov/opa/2012/07/septestimony.shtm. 
 8. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent 
Misuse, 51 IDEA 559, 559 (2011). 
 9. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 7. 
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disputes and gain an advantage over their competitors.10 The 
ITC was originally developed in the protectionist era of the 
1920s and 1930s to shield domestic industry from unlawful 
foreign trade practices, not to enforce intellectual property 
rights.11 Today, the ITC offers several features that make it 
attractive to patent litigants such as quick decisions 
(investigations are usually completed within 12–16 months) 
and administrative law judges that are experienced in patent 
cases.12 The critical distinction between the ITC and federal 
court, though, is the ITC can only issue exclusion orders, which 
stop infringing products at the U.S. border, whereas federal 
courts can provide monetary damages in addition to 
injunctions.13 This threat of an exclusion order can provide the 
SEP holder with significant leverage and increase the risk of 
hold-ups for SEPs. Leveraging the threat of exclusion orders in 
standard-essential patent disputes has also drawn the ire of 
both the FTC14 and Department of Justice.15 The ability to seek 
exclusionary relief at the ITC in these types of cases could have 
a detrimental effect on competition and consumer welfare, 
especially since it could compromise the standard-setting 
system that is critical to encouraging innovation.16 In addition, 
these SEP cases are unique because they involve contractual 
obligations, and the ITC has rejected the availability of several 
affirmative defenses that are often applicable in federal court 
in contract disputes.17
Several high-profile ITC investigations in recent years 
have involved one American company seeking an exclusion 
order against one or more American companies for infringing 
 
                                                                                 
 10. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2 at 1, 2. 
 11. See Louis S. Mastriani & Beau A. Jackson, Section 337 Investigations 
Before the U.S. International Trade Commission: The Evolving Domestic 
Industry Requirement and Its Implications for Global Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 17 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 52, 53 (2011). 
 12. IAN FEINBERG & GARY M. HNATH, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT 
LITIGATION 2012, at 6–7 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2012). 
 13. Kumar, supra note 1, at 537. 
 14. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 78 (prepared statement of 
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 15. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 95–96 (prepared statement of 
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 16. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 1. 
 17. Cf. id. at 3 (stating that in considering these defenses, “the 
Commission has indicated that the fact that an asserted patent is subject to a 
[]RAND obligation does not preclude a finding that a respondent has violated 
section 337 with respect to that patent”). 
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SEPs.18
I.  STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION   
 This Note examines why the ITC is an inappropriate 
forum for these complex battles and the resulting harm to 
American consumers and industry. Part I of this Note provides 
background on SEPs and discusses the ITC’s history and 
purpose. Part II analyzes whether the ITC was intended to 
handle domestic patent disputes and whether it is equipped to 
do so. Part III argues that Congress should prohibit domestic 
companies from seeking exclusion orders for SEPs against 
fellow American companies at the ITC. Specifically, this Note 
contends the ITC was established to protect domestic industry, 
and that interest cannot be served when one American 
company seeks an SEP exclusion order against another 
American company. Rather, the federal court system is better 
equipped to conduct the careful balancing required in these 
cases to protect intellectual property rights and American 
consumers for maximum benefit to the U.S. economy. 
This Part introduces standard-essential patents and 
provides background on the International Trade Commission. 
Section A outlines the many benefits of SEPs both for 
businesses and consumers. It also explains how these patents 
can harm the market through hold-ups and the steps SSOs 
take to reduce this risk. Section B provides a summary of the 
ITC and its relevant statutes. It also gives a brief history of the 
Commission and explains why it is increasingly attractive to 
patent litigants. 
A. STANDARDS AND STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
Industry-wide standards are not a new concept.19 In 1866, 
railroads adopted standard gauge rails throughout the United 
States to eliminate incompatibility between different rail 
networks and facilitate westward expansion.20
                                                                                 
 18. See, e.g., ITC: Microsoft Xbox Doesn't Violate Motorola Mobility 
Patent, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 23, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 
2013-05-23/business/chi-microsoft-motorola-mobility-antitrust-20130523_1_ 
motorola-mobility-itc-judge-david-shaw-standard-essential-patents (detailing 
Motorola’s battle to ban Microsoft’s Xbox video gaming system); Ribeiro, supra 
note 
 Standards have 
2 (highlighting ITC investigations between Motorola and Apple and 
Motorola and Microsoft). 
 19. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 95 (prepared statement of 
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 20. Id. 
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become more prevalent as technology markets have grown over 
the decades.21 In fact, it is not uncommon for today’s 
technologically advanced products to require thousands of 
patented inventions that must work together.22
These industry-wide standards offer many benefits to 
companies and consumers. For one, they allow products from 
different companies to work together which increases the 
chance of market success.
 
23 “[T]hey facilitate the adoption and 
advancement of technology as well as the development of 
products that can interoperate with one another.”24 Standards 
can “create enormous value for consumers by increasing 
competition, innovation, product quality and choice.”25 These 
advantages often result in lower costs for consumers.26 These 
cost savings are realized in two primary ways. First, standards 
can increase manufacturing volume which lowers cost through 
economies of scale.27 Second, standards “increase price 
competition by eliminating ‘switching costs’ for consumers who 
desire to switch from products manufactured by one firm to 
those manufactured by another.”28 However, the benefits for 
consumers do not stop at cost. Standards also can help protect 
public health and safety and promote efficient resource 
allocation.29
The downside of industry-wide standards is they create 
“essential patents.”
 
30
                                                                                 
 21. See Lim, supra note 
 Once manufacturers have started selling 
products based on the standard, “switching to a [non-
standardized] design can be extremely costly and commercially 
8, at 564 (“As high-technology markets 
proliferate, the importance of interoperability standards that permit products 
from different vendors to work together continues to grow.”). 
 22. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 7. 
 23. See 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32 . 
 24. Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790 
(N.D. Tex. 2008).  
 25. Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, & Components 
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, at 2 (June 6, 2012) (Third Party United States 
Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf. 
 26. See Research in Motion, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 790 (explaining that 
standards lower cost by increasing product manufacturing volume and 
increasing price competition). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Joseph F. 
Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 30. Research in Motion, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 791. 
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infeasible.”31 As more and more products adopt the standard, 
the cost of switching to an alternative technology increases,32 
and companies essentially become locked in to using the 
standardized technology.33 When this occurs, royalty rates to 
use the SEP become based not on the patent’s true market 
value but on the costs and delays of switching.34 Therefore, once 
competitors are locked in, the SEP owner can “hold up” an 
entire industry by demanding extremely high prices for the 
license to use the standardized technology.35 This hurts 
consumers by delaying the incorporation of standards into 
products and passing higher royalties through to customers by 
increasing the prices.36
To reduce this risk, SSOs adopt policies to control the 
licensing of SEPs.
 
37 Some SSOs “require members to reveal any 
patents or patent applications that relate to the standard.”38 
There can even be penalties for non-disclosure.39 Other SSOs 
“require members to commit to license their patented 
technologies on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.”40
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
  
The U.S. International Trade Commission is an 
“independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad 
investigative responsibilities on matters of trade.”41
                                                                                 
 31. Lim, supra note 
 The ITC’s 
mission is three-fold: “(1) administer U.S. trade remedy laws 
within its mandate in a fair and objective manner; (2) provide 
the President, [U.S. Trade Representative], and Congress with 
independent analysis, information, and support on matters of 
tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness; and (3) 
maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
8, at 562 (quoting Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2016 (2007)). 
 32. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 6 (statement of Edith Ramirez, 
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 35. See id. at 6–7. 
 36. See id. at 7. 
 37. See Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 
791 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
 38. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32. 
 39. Lim, supra note 8, at 567. 
 40. 2 SZCZEPANSKI, supra note 4, § 8E:32 .  
 41. About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc 
.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
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(HTS).”42 It is headed by six commissioners appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.43 The ITC’s main 
statutory authority for the purposes of this Note originates in 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which “makes it unlawful, 
among other unfair acts, to import any article that infringes a 
patent, trade mark or copyright that is valid and enforceable in 
the United States.”44 In addition to Section 337 investigations, 
the ITC investigates anti-dumping and illegal subsidy claims, 
administers the tariff system, and performs industry and 
macroeconomic analyses.45 Frequent litigants at the ITC 
include prominent multinational corporations such as Apple, 
Rolls-Royce, Microsoft, General Electric, Samsung, Pfizer, and 
Ford.46
Section 1337 gives the ITC jurisdiction over “[u]nfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
articles” that “(i) . . . destroy or substantially injure an industry 
in the United States; (ii) . . . prevent the establishment of such 
an industry; or (iii) . . . restrain or monopolize trade and 
commerce in the United States.”
 
47 In addition, Section 1337 
bans the importation into the United States of any products 
that “infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent.”48
1. The History of the ITC 
 
Examining the ITC’s history shows its formation and 
subsequent development resulted from protectionist sentiments 
in the first third of the 20th century.49 Woodrow Wilson 
established the ITC’s predecessor, the Tariff Commission, in 
1916 as a regulatory agency to assist the President in trade-
related decisions.50 One of its roles was to “spot unfair trade 
practices and dumping, and conduct other, similar investigative 
functions.”51
                                                                                 
 42. Id. 
 Congress officially authorized the Commission’s 
 43. Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 52. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (explaining the authority of the ITC). 
 46. Id. at 53. 
 47. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See JOHN M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND 
AND EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 (1976). 
 50. WENDY L. HANSEN, REGULATORY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
TRADE POLICY: A STUDY OF ITC DECISION-MAKING 1975–1985, at 3 (1990). 
 51. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 87. 
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creation in the Revenue Act of 1916.52 Then in 1922, the 
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act gave the Commission a more 
advanced role in investigating unfair trade practices.53 The 
emphasis on protecting U.S. industry was paramount.54 “The 
act defined as unfair any practice, the effect or tendency of 
which was to destroy or substantially injure a U.S. 
industry . . . .”55 The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1934 reorganized the 
Tariff Commission and established more specific powers and 
detailed procedures for its unfair trade practice 
investigations.56 Section 337 and the Commission’s related 
responsibilities were first outlined in this Act.57
In the Trade Act of 1974, the Tariff Commission was 
renamed the International Trade Commission.
 
58 The Act added 
additional procedural requirements to conform with the 
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, and it enlarged 
the Commission’s responsibility for areas of relief under section 
337.59 Most importantly, it empowered the ITC to grant 
exclusion orders60 on its own, a power previously limited to the 
President upon receiving a recommendation from the 
Commission.61 Since 1974, there have been over 850 Section 
337 investigations at the ITC.62 While the ITC has traditionally 
handled other trade issues, like antidumping claims,63 rather 
than intellectual property disputes, ninety-four percent of all 
Section 337 investigations in recent years have involved patent 
infringement.64 Potential reasons for this will be discussed 
below.65
                                                                                 
 52. Taras M. Czebiniak, When Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do You 
Wear? Choosing Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in 
§ 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99 (2011). 
 
 53. See 62 CONG. REC. 12,490 (1922) (statement of the Managers on the 
part of the House); DOBSON, supra note 49, at 94; HANSEN, supra note 50, at 3.  
 54. See DOBSON, supra note 49, at 94. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 34. 
 57. Id. at 102–03. 
 58. HANSEN, supra note 50, at 9. 
 59. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129. 
 60. See infra Part I.B.2 for a description of exclusion orders. 
 61. DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129–30. 
 62. MARCIA H. SUNDEEN ET AL., UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC: A 
TREATISE ON SECTION 337 ACTIONS § 1:10 (2012). 
 63. See Joe Mullin, ITC Annual Survey: A Gatekeeper’s Power Persists, 
CORP. COUNS., May 1, 2009, at 1. 
 64. Kumar, supra note 1, at 532. 
 65. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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2. Procedure and Remedies at the ITC 
To litigate at the ITC, a claimant is first required to 
demonstrate the existence of an industry in the United States 
related to the matter before the Commission.66 However, the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,67 the Coaxial 
Cable Connectors ITC decision,68 and the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in InterDigital Communications v. International Trade 
Commission69 have eased this domestic industry requirement in 
recent years.70 In addition to establishing the existence of a 
domestic industry, the claimant must also establish 
importation and infringement of the asserted intellectual 
property right.71 If the ITC decides the action has merit, it 
opens an investigation.72
Once an investigation is opened, the ITC refers it to one of 
six administrative law judges (ALJs) for an evidentiary 
hearing.
 
73 There is a short period of discovery—often less than 
five months—and then a hearing, typically only six or seven 
months after the ITC opens the investigation.74 The ALJ then 
issues an Initial Determination, which is automatically 
considered by the six-member Commission.75
                                                                                 
 66. See Kumar, supra note 
 The Commission 
has the option to decline review (in which case the Initial 
Determination becomes final), review and adopt the Initial 
1, at 534 (stating that a claimant “must show 
that ‘an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the 
patent, . . . exists or is in the process of being established’” and that the ITC 
divides this requirement into a technical prong and an economic prong, of 
which the claimant must prove at least one)(quoting § 19 U.S.C. 1337(a)(2)). 
 67. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012); see Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 110–11 
(explaining that the Act eliminated the requirement that the domestic 
industry be “efficiently and economically operat[ed]” and expanded the 
definition of “substantial investment”). 
 68. Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors & Components Thereof & Prods. 
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283 (Nov. 2011) (Final).  
 69. 690 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that licensing activities 
can fulfill the domestic industry requirement). 
 70. Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 105, 114; see Certain Coaxial Cable 
Connectors & Components Thereof & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-
TA-650, USITC Pub. 4283, 44 (Nov. 2011) (Final) (holding that litigation costs 
related to licensing the patent at issue may satisfy the domestic industry 
requirement). 
 71. Tom M. Schaumberg et al., Advantages of a Section 337 Investigation 
at the U.S. International Trade Commission, IP LITIGATOR, May–June 2006, 
at 24. 
 72. Kumar, supra note 1, at 536. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
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Determination, modify it, or reverse it.76 Once the Commission 
rules, any order goes into effect after sixty days.77 The 
President can disapprove and reverse it on policy grounds,78 
although this is very rare.79
If the ITC determines a violation has occurred, it has only 
one remedy—issuing an exclusion order directing U.S. Customs 
officials to stop infringing products at the border.
 
80 There are 
two types of exclusion orders. The more common is a limited 
exclusion order, which “prevents entry of a particular 
company’s goods.”81 General exclusion orders “prohibit[] 
importation of all infringing goods, including those of third-
parties.”82 To obtain a general exclusion order, the complainant 
must show (1) it is necessary to prevent circumvention of a 
limited exclusion order and (2) there is a pattern of violation or 
difficulty in identifying the infringing products’ source.83 Cease-
and-desist orders can also be issued in limited circumstances to 
“prevent the sale of ‘commercially significant’ domestic 
inventories of infringing goods.”84
A party litigating before the ITC can also simultaneously 
litigate the same patent infringement dispute in federal court, 
creating the possibility of inconsistent rulings if the ITC and 
the court disagree on whether the infringement occurred or on 
the appropriate remedy,
  
85 a problem that is exacerbated by the 
fact that ITC decisions are not accorded collateral estoppel 
effect.86
                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 537. 
 In fact, in almost ninety percent of ITC investigations 
 77. Id. 
 78. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012). 
 79. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 537 n.43 (explaining that ITC decisions 
have only been overturned five times and not since the mid-1980s). But see 
Brian X. Chen, Obama Administration Overturns Ban on Apple Products, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 3, 2013, 4:23 PM) http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 
08/03/obama-administration-overturns-ban-on-apple-products/ (reporting the 
Obama administration’s veto of an ITC exclusion order, the first time an 
exclusion order has been vetoed since 1987). 
 80. Kumar, supra note 1, at 565. 
 81. Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PATENT LITIGATION 2012, at 259, 263 (Ian Feinberg & Gary M. Hnath eds., 
2012). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Kumar, supra note 1, at 538. 
 85. See id. at 538–39. 
 86. See id. at 540. 
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there are also related cases brought in federal district court.87 
Of twenty-two parallel cases from 1972 to 2006, nine resulted 
in conflicting decisions.88
3. Increasing Attractiveness of the ITC 
  
The ITC is an increasingly attractive venue for companies. 
For instance, in 2003, 18 Section 337 complaints were filed.89 
That number increased to 36 in 2009 and up to 70 in 2011.90 In 
fact, caseload at the ITC has increased five-fold over the past 
15 years.91 Part of the increase is attributable to the 1988 
amendments to the ITC statute and recent decisions that 
broadened the definition of domestic industry.92 While the ITC 
hears a variety of cases,93 standard-essential patent claims 
from high-tech consumer electronics and electronic device 
companies are among the most frequent cases.94 In a review of 
ITC cases, seventy-five percent of section 337 investigations 
and eighty percent of the most recent investigations involve 
electronic and computer-related industries.95 These cases are 
particularly prevalent because “most products containing these 
technologies are manufactured abroad and imported into the 
United States.”96
Several features of the ITC’s statutory provisions and 
procedures make it attractive to patent litigants. First, the ITC 
  
                                                                                 
 87. Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade 
Commission as a Patent Venue, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 24 (2011). 
 88. Kumar, supra note 1, at 539. 
 89. Hnath, supra note 81, at 265. 
 90. Id.; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FY 2011 AT A GLANCE: 
OPERATION 2: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS (2011), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/YIR_OP4_final.pdf. 
 91. Colleen V. Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 171 (2011). 
 92. See SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 14; Kumar, supra note 1, at 
532; see also supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Joe Mullin, International Trade Commission Survey 2010: Casting 
a Wider Net, CORP. COUNSEL, June 18, 2010 (stating that companies that 
manufacture “quirky products” such as sandals, toys, and games used to, and 
occasionally still do, petition the ITC); Daniel D. Quick & Jonathan Redway, 
Barring the Door: The International Trade Commission as a Means to Prevent 
Importation of Goods Utilizing Misappropriated Trade Secrets, MICH. BUS. 
L.J., Spring 2012, at 39, 40 (describing examples of ITC cases dealing with 
industries other than consumer electronics). 
 94. See Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 2; Mullin, supra note 93. 
 95. Cotropia, supra note 87, at 24. 
 96. Id. at 5. 
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issues its decisions quickly.97 By statute, the ITC is required to 
“conclude any such investigation and make its 
determination . . . at the earliest practicable time after the date 
of publication of notice of such investigation.”98 A timeline of 
twelve to sixteen months from start to completion is typical.99 
That is about half the time of an average district court 
litigation.100 Even traditional “rocket-docket” districts are being 
flooded with cases and experiencing slower case schedules, 
which makes the ITC even more attractive.101 In addition to its 
speed, the ITC has in rem jurisdiction over the actual products, 
allowing it to reach foreign companies that are beyond the 
reach of federal courts.102 Nationwide personal jurisdiction 
provides the ability to name all known companies importing 
infringing products in one proceeding and compel testimony 
from a third party anywhere in the United States.103 Process is 
also easier to serve.104 In fact, discovery can begin as soon as an 
investigation is instituted, so litigants do not have to wait for 
perfect service of foreign parties as in district court.105 The ITC 
also provides for broad discovery with few limits on 
interrogatories, foreign discovery, or scope of discovery,106 and 
respondents must produce requested information or default.107 
Another attractive feature is that the ALJs have extensive 
experience in patent cases108 and the complex technologies 
involved.109
                                                                                 
 97. See Hnath, supra note 
 However, the opportunity to obtain an exclusion 
order prohibiting an infringing competitor from even importing 
its products into the country is perhaps the ITC’s most 
81, at 264. 
 98. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012). 
 99. Hnath, supra note 81, at 264. 
 100. Mullin, supra note 63, at 1. 
 101. See Eileen McDermott, The End of the Rocket Docket, 212 MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP. 43, 45 (2011) (explaining that so called “rocket-dockets” like the 
Eastern District of Texas are backed up because they have attracted so many 
cases in recent years). But see Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent 
Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 415–16 (2010) (arguing that “rocket dockets” still 
exist in some districts). 
 102. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 535; Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, 
at 53. 
 103. See Bruce Barker & Stewart Brown, Why You Should Consider the 
ITC Option, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr. 2003, at 39, 41. 
 104. Hnath, supra note 81, at 264. 
 105. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 53. 
 106. Kumar, supra note 1, at 536. 
 107. Hnath, supra note 81, at 264. 
 108. Id. at 265; see also Kumar, supra note 1, at 536. 
 109. Barker & Brown, supra note 103, at 40. 
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appealing aspect for many litigants.110 Preventing a competi-
tor’s product from reaching the market is especially valuable in 
the technology industry—the source of most SEP investigations 
at the ITC—because of the short product lifecycles.111 As a 
result, the damage can be significant even if an exclusion order 
is overturned on appeal.112 While the exclusion order has the 
benefit of preventing U.S. consumers from purchasing the 
competitor’s product, it can also have an impact on global 
sales.113 For instance, if the competitor’s product is designed to 
be incorporated into an end product,114 overseas buyers will not 
use the competitor’s product if the end product could not be sold 
in the United States.115
For these reasons, American companies are turning to the 
ITC to litigate SEP disputes with other American companies.
 
116 
As an example, since 2010, Motorola has been pursuing a high-
profile case against Apple before the ITC over alleged SEP 
infringement, which could result in banning the importation of 
popular Apple products including iPhones, iPads, and Mac 
computers.117
                                                                                 
 110. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 
 In another example, Motorola has pursued an 
11, at 53 (“[T]he unique power of 
the Commission’s remedies . . . is an important tactical asset for s.337 
complainants.”). 
 111. Ryan N. Herrington & Brendan P. Rogers, Shock and Awe: The 
Increasing Popularity and Intrinsic Value of an ITC Investigation, IP 
LITIGATOR, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 10. 
 112. Id. While exclusion orders are not enforced during appeal, 
customers—whether end consumers or other businesses looking to include the 
technology in their own products—will be hesitant to purchase or use a 
product facing an impending exclusion order because of the drastic 
consequences if the exclusion order is upheld. 
 113. Id. 
 114. As an example, if there is an ITC investigation regarding the 
technology used for a certain type of interactive programming guide and 
parental control technology for televisions, television or set-top box makers are 
unlikely to use that technology in their products to prevent their own products 
from being banned for incorporating the technology subject to exclusion order. 
See Eric Schweibenz & Thomas Yebernetsky, ALJ Shaw Denies Motions in 
Certain Products Containing Interactive Program Guide and Parental Control 
Technology (337-TA-845), ITC 337 L. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.itcblog 
.com/20130221/alj-shaw-denies-motions-in-certain-products-containing 
-interactive-program-guide-and-parental-control-technology-337-ta-845/. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See generally Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 88–90 (prepared 
statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (providing an 
overview of the use of the ITC in SEP cases and the FTC’s concern over this 
practice). 
 117. See Complaint at 1–3, Certain Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable 
Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
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ITC case against Microsoft alleging that the Xbox infringes on 
SEPs owned by Motorola, threatening the availability of the 
popular gaming console to American consumers.118 In both 
cases, the Federal Trade Commission petitioned the ITC to not 
grant exclusion orders as it would be contrary to the public 
interest.119 The complainants in SEP cases are not limited to 
only large public companies though. For instance, Linex 
Technologies, Inc., of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, brought a 
case before the ITC alleging its SEPs, which limit fading of 
wireless internet signal strength in buildings, were being 
infringed by several domestic companies including Hewlett-
Packard and Apple.120 This case called into question the 
availability of every MacBook model and many HP products 
including PCs and servers.121
II.  SUITABILITY OF THE ITC FOR DOMESTIC 
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT LITIGATION   
 
This Part analyzes why the ITC is not an appropriate 
venue for SEP disputes between domestic companies. First, it 
examines the negative effects on competition and consumer 
welfare resulting from these cases. Next, it explains why 
domestic SEP litigation is contrary to the ITC’s history and the 
statutory intent. This Part also examines whether federal 
courts have the tools needed to decide these cases and reach the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
337-TA-740, USITC Pub. 2759 (Oct. 6, 2010) (outlining the background of the 
case and Motorola’s claims); Ribeiro, supra note 2 (providing an update of the 
adjudication and highlighting the potential consequences). 
 118. See Complaint at 1, 6–7, Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related 
Software, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-749, USITC Pub. 2770 
(Nov. 22, 2010). 
 119. See Certain Gaming & Entm’t Consoles, Related Software, & 
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752 (Third Party United States Federal 
Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf. 
 120. See Complaint at 1, Certain Wireless Commc’n Devices & Sys., 
Components Thereof, & Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC 
Pub. 2802 (May 6, 2011); Susan Decker, Apple, HP, Aruba Accused by Linex of 
Infringing Wi-Fi Patents, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-09/apple-hp-aruba-accused-by-linex-of 
-infringing-wi-fi-patents.html; Alex Gasser, Linex Files New 337 Complaint 
Regarding Certain Wireless Communication Devices and Systems, ITC 337 L. 
BLOG (May 10, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.itcblog.com/20110510/linex 
-files-new-337-complaint-regarding-certain-wireless-communication-devices 
-and-systems/.  
 121. Steven Sande, Apple Accused of Violating Patented Wi-Fi Antenna 
Designs, TUAW (May 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.tuaw.com/2011/05/18/ 
apple-accused-of-violating-patented-wi-fi-antenna-designs/. 
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outcome that maximizes benefits for American consumers and 
industry. Finally, this Part analyzes previously proposed 
solutions and explains why they are either too broad or are not 
guaranteed to remedy the situation. 
A. DOMESTIC COMPANIES LITIGATING SEP DISPUTES AT THE 
ITC 
Over the past decade, domestic companies have 
increasingly found themselves vulnerable to litigation at the 
ITC. For instance, the Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits 
ruling extended jurisdiction over allegedly infringing imports 
by domestic companies.122 After this decision, the ITC’s 
jurisdiction even extends to U.S. manufacturers that simply 
offshore the assembly of products that are otherwise 
manufactured in the United States.123 This means the ITC can 
issue exclusion orders against products that are nearly 
completely manufactured in the United States but are shipped 
abroad to apply “finishing touches” before being sold in the 
United States.124 Furthermore, even if the product is 
manufactured in the United Sates, many domestic 
manufacturers include at least one imported component in 
their supply chain due to globalization.125 This arrangement 
leaves these companies exposed to Section 337 investigations 
because these components can be subject to exclusion orders. 
While ITC jurisdiction traditionally extended primarily to 
products by foreign companies wholly manufactured in foreign 
countries and then imported into the United States, domestic 
respondents now appear in eighty seven percent of all ITC 
cases because of these expansions of the type of products that 
fall within the ITC’s jurisdiction.126
As the number of domestic respondents at the ITC has 
grown, it is important to critically consider the ITC’s suitability 
for SEP disputes between two domestic companies. One 
primary concern is that the ability to seek exclusionary relief at 
the ITC in these cases could jeopardize the standard-setting 
 
                                                                                 
 122. SUNDEEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 13–14. 
 123. See Bryan A. Schwartz, Beyond the Amendments: Federal and ITC 
Case Law Developments That May Determine the Long-Term Future of Section 
337 Litigation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 491, 497–98 (1994).  
 124. See id.  
 125. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of 
Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
63, 89 (2008). 
 126. Kumar, supra note 1, at 575. 
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system, which would have negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare by increasing switching costs.127 Another 
reason the ITC may not be appropriate for these cases is that 
they involve contractual obligations between the parties due to 
the commitment to license SEPs on RAND terms. But, the ITC 
has rejected affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel, 
contract, implied license, and waiver that may be applicable in 
such contract disputes.128 In fact, in an ITC investigation in 
1987, the ITC “indicated that it was not the appropriate forum 
for patent litigation involving a contractual commitment to 
renegotiate an expired license in good faith.”129
Recent federal court decisions asserting that the 
availability of injunctive relief is limited in domestic SEP cases 
further support the position that the ITC is not an appropriate 
forum for these disputes because exclusion orders are the ITC’s 
only remedy. In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Judge Richard 
Posner, sitting by designation, said standard-essential patent 
owners should not be entitled to injunctive relief unless the 
licensee refuses to pay a RAND royalty.
 This 
commitment is analogous to the commitment an SEP owner 
has to license the SEP to its competitors on RAND terms. 
Therefore, the ITC has admitted on its own accord that it is not 
the appropriate forum for domestic SEP disputes. 
130
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.
 eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, established a four-factor test for 
determining whether a patent owner is entitled to injunctive 
relief:  
131
Judge Posner reasoned that by committing to license its SEP 
on RAND terms, the owner “implicitly acknowledge[s] that a 
royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that 
patent.”
  
132
                                                                                 
 127. Bartowski & Langdon, supra note 
 Therefore, if Judge Posner’s reasoning is accurate, 
an SEP plaintiff cannot meet the second part of the eBay test 
2, at 1. 
 128. Cf. supra note 17. 
 129. Id. at 8. 
 130. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 
2012). 
 131. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 132. Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 914. 
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because the owner acknowledges monetary damages would not 
be inadequate by agreeing to license on RAND terms.133 If 
injunctions are not an appropriate form of relief in these cases, 
then exclusion orders, which also prevent the sale of the 
infringing product, are not appropriate either. However, there 
is no other option at the ITC since the ITC cannot provide 
monetary damages.134 The statutory regime governing the ITC, 
which mandates an exclusion order if a violation is found, 
overrides the common law principles of equity expressed in 
eBay.135
B. DOMESTIC SEP DISPUTES ARE CONTRARY TO THE ITC’S 
PURPOSE 
 The only conclusion is that these cases cannot be 
appropriately handled by the ITC. 
In addition to its inability to fashion remedies that are 
tailored to the unique features of domestic SEP cases, issuing 
exclusion orders in these cases is arguably contrary to the ITC’s 
purpose. Congress established the ITC to protect domestic 
industry. The statutes governing the ITC reinforce this purpose 
and require the Commission to act for the benefit of American 
consumers. While the ITC does have one statutory provision 
that could arguably allow it some flexibility in deciding SEP 
cases to produce outcomes beneficial for American consumers 
and industry, it has rarely utilized this provision. As a result, 
the ITC cannot remain true to its history or statutory intent 
when deciding domestic SEP disputes. 
1. The ITC’s Protectionist History 
The ITC’s nearly century-long history reveals that its 
primary purpose has always been protecting domestic industry. 
Perhaps no one stated it as clearly as Rep. Lazaro who, when 
                                                                                 
 133. See id. at 915 (“[]RAND royalty would provide all the relief to which a 
[plaintiff] would be entitled if it proved infringement . . . and thus it is not 
entitled to an injunction.”). 
 134. See Hnath, supra note 81. 
 135. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and 
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (stating that the ITC has 
declined to follow eBay and that the Federal Circuit has approved of this 
approach). The Patent Act, which Article III courts apply when deciding these 
disputes, expressly retains the common law principles of equity expressed in 
eBay, while no such provision is included in the ITC statutes. Kumar, supra 
note 1, at 577. While the ITC says these factors are taken into account under 
the public interest factor of its statutory scheme, this has never prevented the 
ITC from issuing an exclusion order in nearly twenty-five years. Id.  
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addressing the creation of the Trade Commission in the 1922 
Tariff Act, said on the House floor, “our duty as legislators is to 
look after the interests of America first.”136 His statement was 
followed by applause.137 Statements like these have led scholars 
to conclude that “Congress created the ITC to gain protectionist 
support for trade reform.”138 In fact, even those who advocated 
for an apolitical Tariff Commission saw its purpose as 
protecting domestic industry.139
Since the Tariff Act of 1922, the Commission has been 
responsible for investigating unfair foreign trade practices 
against the United States.
 
140 The Commission’s protectionist 
purpose is evident from the Tariff Act’s language. The bill’s 
title even identifies it as “[a]n Act . . . to encourage the 
industries of the United States.”141 This is a common aspect of 
the bills that created or granted authorization to the ITC—they 
all relate to protecting American industry.142 The Tariff Act also 
charges the Commission with investigating acts “the effect or 
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an 
industry . . . in the United States.”143
Recent revisions to the statutes governing the ITC have 
maintained the Commission’s original purpose. In the 1974 
Trade Act, Congress expanded the ITC’s powers to guard 
against unfair imports.
 
144 Once again, commentators pointed 
out the protectionist slant of the ITC statutes.145
                                                                                 
 136. 62 CONG. REC. 12,522 (1922) (statement of Rep. Lazaro). 
 In 1986, the 
 137. Id. 
 138. Kumar, supra note 1, at 540; see also 62 CONG. REC. 12,712–13 (1922) 
(statement of Rep. Longworth) (stating that he is in support of protecting not 
only the industries in his district but industries nationwide). 
 139. See 62 CONG. REC. 12,522 (1922) (statement of Rep. Lazaro) 
(explaining that the Tariff Commission should be nonpartisan and committed 
to “reasonable protection”). 
 140. See DOBSON, supra note 49, at 33. 
 141. Tariff Act of 1922, H.R. 7456, 67th Cong. (1922) (as passed by Senate, 
Sept. 20, 1922). 
 142. See Czebiniak, supra note 52, at 98–99 n.39 (presenting a list of the 
purposes of the acts which have created or amended the ITC statutes). 
 143. H.R. 7456, § 316(a). 
 144. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 544 (explaining that to protect domestic 
industry from unfair practices, Congress made the ITC more independent and 
gave it new powers). 
 145. See, e.g., DOBSON, supra note 49, at 129 (citing press comments 
criticizing the 1974 Trade Act and the ITC for protectionism); John M. Dobson, 
Six Decades of Stalemate: The Changing Mandate of the U.S. Tariff 
Commission, 14 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 269, 276 (1980) [hereinafter Six 
Decades] (“[A] number of individuals both inside and outside the commission 
consider [the Trade Act of 1974] a protectionist law.”). 
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ITC itself noted in a report that Section 337 “was originally 
intended as a trade statute to protect U S [sic] workers and 
firms from all types of unfair foreign trade practices.”146 Even 
the 1988 broadening of the definition of domestic industry, 
which has arguably allowed more foreign claimants at the ITC, 
was done with the intent “to protect domestic IP holders from 
infringement by foreign companies.”147
This legislative history leads to the conclusion that Section 
337, which governs the ITC and which domestic companies use 
to litigate SEP cases, is a trade statute to protect American 
industry, not enforce intellectual property rights.
  
148 This is an 
interpretation supported by international observers and federal 
courts. For instance, when the United States became a party to 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, which require countries to 
treat imports no less favorably than domestic products, 
foreigners complained that the ITC violated this 
requirement.149 The Federal Circuit has said that federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases while ITC 
authority is limited to investigating “unfair practices in import 
trade.”150 If the ITC was created to protect domestic industry, as 
the legislative history indicates, it is not the appropriate forum 
for settling domestic SEP disputes. As stated in the Tariff Act 
of 1922, the ITC was established to prevent acts which could 
“destroy or substantially injure an industry . . .in the United 
States.”151
                                                                                 
 146. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-86-150, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: STRENGTHENING TRADE LAW PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 22 (1986), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130844 
.pdf.  
 This purpose cannot be carried out when one 
domestic company seeks an exclusion order against another 
American company for infringing an SEP. It seems highly 
unlikely that Apple, by infringing a Motorola patent needed for 
the iPhone to receive data by wireless transmission, is seeking 
to “destroy or substantially injure” the industry in which it 
generates $22 billion per quarter, more than all of Microsoft’s 
 147. Kumar, supra note 1, at 532. 
 148. See Mastriani & Jackson, supra note 11, at 53. 
 149. See Report of the Panel, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. 36S/345 at 14 (1990); Report of the 
Panel, United States—Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, 
L/5333 (May 26, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. 30S/107 at 4 (1984). 
 150. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 559. 
 151. Tariff Act of 1922, H.R. 7456, 67th Cong. § 316(a) (1922) (as passed by 
Senate, Sept. 20, 1922). 
  
732 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:713 
 
revenue streams combined.152
2. ITC Decisions in Domestic SEP Disputes Are Inconsistent 
with Policy Goals Expressed in the ITC Statutes 
 Given these absurdities, the ITC 
should not be deciding domestic SEP disputes.  
The ITC’s protectionist history is reflected in the policy 
goals expressed through the drafting of the statute. In many 
cases, the ITC’s role in deciding SEP disputes between two 
domestic companies is contrary to policy goals. “[T]he ITC 
exists to protect US industry from unfair trade 
practices . . . .”153 Consistent with this principle, the ITC’s 
statutory language makes clear that access to the ITC for 
patent cases is “only justified in cases where infringing imports 
may harm a domestic industry.”154 The ITC, by statute, only 
commences an investigation if “an industry in the United 
States, relating to the articles protected by the patent . . . exists 
or is in the process of being established.”155 This requirement 
would not be included in the statute if the ITC’s purpose is 
something other than protecting domestic industry. The statute 
also requires the ITC to consider the “competitive conditions in 
the United States economy” before issuing an exclusion order.156
Another policy decision reflected in the ITC statutes is a 
much more relaxed standard for issuing exclusion orders than 
the standard courts use for issuing injunctions, based on the 
rationale that this strong patent rights enforcement spurs 
innovation.
 
Again, this requirement indicates the goal of ITC action is the 
advancement of the U.S. economy. 
157
                                                                                 
 152. See Tim Worstall, Apple’s iPhone Is Now Worth More Than All of 
Microsoft, FORBES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/ 
2012/08/19/apples-iphone-is-now-worth-more-than-all-of-microsoft/. 
 However, in cases where domestic companies are 
litigating over an SEP, this relaxed standard can actually 
hinder innovation by making it more difficult or even 
impossible for companies to incorporate into their products 
standardized technologies that are necessary to compete in the 
marketplace. Because of the ease of obtaining exclusion orders, 
the SEP’s owner can demand outrageous licensing fees knowing 
 153. Barker & Brown, supra note 103, at 39. 
 154. Chien, supra note 91, at 177. 
 155. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012). 
 156. Id. § 1337(d)(1). 
 157. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 566 (stating that the ITC standard for 
issuing injunctive relief is more relaxed than in eBay on the assumption that 
strong enforcement through injunctive relief encourages innovation). 
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that the competitor is faced with three undesirable options: (1) 
pay the licensing fee and make little profit or even lose money 
selling the product, (2) refuse to obtain a license and have the 
product seized at the border by Customs Officials pursuant to 
an ITC exclusion order, or (3) never bring the product to the 
marketplace. Most companies faced with these choices will 
simply choose not to bring the product to the marketplace. As a 
result, the ITC’s relaxed standard actually hinders innovation 
in these cases. 
Another frequent justification for ITC exclusion orders is 
that “the public interest favors the protection of U.S. 
intellectual property rights by excluding infringing imports.”158 
However, this justification does not exist for domestic SEP 
cases. In fact, the Supreme Court has said “[i]mport 
restrictions . . . rest on different considerations and different 
rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”159
A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a potential power 
for evil over an industry which must be recognized as an important 
element in the amusement life of the nation . . . if sustained would be 
gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a 
favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.
 Along 
those same lines, the Court has argued:  
160
Taken together, these statements from the Court indicate there 
are different factors that must be considered in the domestic 
realm than in the international realm. Infringement of U.S. 
intellectual property by foreign companies harms the public 
interest by stealing revenue from U.S. companies. In domestic 
SEP disputes, any revenue generated from selling infringing 
product remains in the U.S. economy. The dispute is over 
whose “private fortune” will benefit and whose will suffer. 
According to the Supreme Court, our law in general favors 
consumers’ “amusement” over how to divide profit between two 
U.S. companies.
 
161
Thus, it is more important that consumers have access to 
iPads and Xboxes than to have them stopped at the border 
  
                                                                                 
 158. Id. at 571 (quoting In re Laser Bar Code Scanners & Scan Engines, 
Components Thereof & Prods. Containing Same, Intl. Trade Comm’n Inv. No. 
337-TA-551, 2007 ITC LEXIS 623, at *34–35 (June 14, 2007) (citing Two-
Handle Centerset Fausets & Escutcheons, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
337-TA-422, USITC Pub. 3332 (June 19, 2000))). 
 159. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 
125 (1973). 
 160. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
519 (1917). 
 161. See id. 
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because two U.S. companies cannot agree on a reasonable 
licensing rate for a standardized technology. However, the ITC 
statutes, which are tailored for infringement by foreign 
companies as explained above, are not designed to allow the 
ITC to engage in this pattern of analysis. 
Finally, since one of the factors the ITC must consider 
when issuing an exclusion order is the existence of U.S. jobs in 
the industry, one of the ITC’s main purposes is to protect 
American jobs.162 However, in domestic SEP disputes, this 
purpose is difficult to carry out. From a manufacturing 
perspective, most consumer electronics, even those produced by 
U.S. companies, are manufactured outside the United States.163
3. The ITC’s Public Welfare Exception 
 
Therefore, the exclusion order is not keeping Americans 
employed in the manufacture of the goods. In fact, an exclusion 
order has the potential to destroy American jobs. If an 
American company cannot manufacture a product due to an 
exclusion order or the threat of an exclusion order, the support 
jobs here in the United States, such as product design and 
marketing, will likely disappear. Once again, in this setting, 
the ITC is actually acting against the goals and principles 
established in its statutory scheme. 
The ITC arguably does have within its statutes a provision 
that would allow it some flexibility in issuing exclusion orders 
in domestic SEP cases. Section 337 requires the ITC to consider 
the “public health and welfare” and the “competitive conditions 
in the United States economy” before issuing an exclusion 
order.164 This provision could allow the ITC to conduct the 
analysis advocated in the previous sections when deciding SEP 
cases.165 In fact, the Department of Justice and the FTC have 
urged the ITC to apply the public welfare exception in domestic 
SEP disputes.166
                                                                                 
 162. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 However, the ITC has rarely exercised this 
 163. See Cotropia, supra note 87, at 5. 
 164. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
 165. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (arguing that special considerations must be 
taken into account when two domestic companies are litigating over an SEP). 
 166. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 102 (prepared statement of 
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“As the 
ITC has observed, these public interest factors are not meant to be given mere 
lip service, but rather public health and welfare and the assurance of 
competitive conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding 
considerations in the administration of this statute.”) (internal citations 
omitted); id. at 91 (prepared statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
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exception, with ALJs using it only four times in recent 
decades.167 None of these instances involved SEPs or related 
issues.168
C. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS TO DECIDE 
THESE CASES 
 Considering the ITC declines to use what statutory 
authority it does have to handle domestic SEP cases more 
appropriately, even in the midst of appeals from fellow 
government agencies, the ITC is simply not the appropriate 
forum for handling cases where domestic companies are 
litigating over an SEP. 
As explained above, the ITC’s statutes and legislative 
intent make it ill-equipped to resolve domestic SEP disputes in 
a manner consistent with public policy. In contrast, the federal 
court system is well-tailored to handle these cases for several 
reasons. First, federal courts are not limited to exclusion orders 
or injunctions—the federal court counterpart. Scholars argue 
that “[t]he [I]TC’s overuse of injunctive relief has led to 
decisions that harm domestic companies and threaten 
innovation.”169 Banning products often discourages innovation 
and makes it unprofitable to produce products.170
Second, if there is a domestic SEP case where a ban of an 
infringing product truly serves the public interest, federal 
 For these 
reasons, it is advantageous to have these cases settled in a 
venue that has other remedies available.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Comm’n) (“The FTC believes that the ITC has the authority under its public 
interest obligations to resolve all of these questions, and to deny an exclusion 
order if the holder of the RAND-encumbered SEP has not complied with its 
RAND obligation.”). 
 167. Herrington & Rogers, supra note 111, at 12. 
 168. The circumstances in which the ITC denied or limited an exclusion 
order on public interest grounds were: (1) preventing the exclusion of an 
“automobile engine component that improved fuel economy” during an energy 
crisis, (2) protecting the public health interest by permitting the use of foreign 
products for atomic research that were superior to the domestic alternative, 
(3) not banning “specialized hospital beds for burn patients when the domestic 
producer could not supply alternative beds within a reasonable time,” and (4) 
not banning certain infringing semiconductor chips for wireless 
communication devices needed by first responders in emergencies. See 
Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 87 n.28 (prepared statement of Edith 
Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n); Herrington & Rogers, supra note 111, 
at 12. 
 169. Kumar, supra note 1, at 533. 
 170. See id. at 571–72. 
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courts have the ability to issue an injunction.171 Both district 
court injunctions and limited exclusion orders can prevent the 
infringing product that is the subject of litigation from entering 
the market.172 Thus, except in the rare case where a general 
exclusion order is appropriate, federal courts are able to offer 
an SEP owner effectively the same remedy as the ITC if it is 
warranted. The key difference between the ITC and the federal 
courts is that the ITC must issue an exclusion order if a patent 
is infringed while courts must exercise discretion when issuing 
an injunction.173 This is because the ITC does not have to follow 
the precedent established by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, which requires plaintiffs seeking a 
permanent injunction in patent cases to satisfy a four-factor 
test before a court will issue an injunction.174 In contrast, the 
ITC statute requires issuing an exclusion order anytime there 
is infringement.175 The ITC says it is not required to follow eBay 
because Section 337 “represents a legislative modification of 
the traditional test in equity [encapsulated in the eBay test] . . . 
[and] it is unnecessary to show irreparable harm to the 
patentee in the case of infringement by importation.”176
In addition to discretion in granting injunctions, federal 
courts offer an opportunity to consider a wider array of 
remedies and defenses than the ITC. In terms of remedies, 
federal courts can award monetary damages in addition to or in 
 
Domestic SEP cases at the ITC are not substantively different 
from an SEP patent case brought in federal court, so it is 
irrational to apply the four-part eBay test in federal court and 
not at the ITC. 
                                                                                 
 171. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (stating that federal courts may grant 
injunctions consistent with the principles of equity to prevent a violation of 
patent rights). 
 172. See Richard G. Allison, Note, Section 337 Proceedings Before the 
International Trade Commission: Antiquated Legislative Compromise or Model 
Forum for Patent Dispute Resolution?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 873, 883 (2009). 
 173. See Chien, supra note 91, at 172 (showing that according to statute, 
the ITC “shall” issue an exclusion order if there is a violation while district 
courts “may” grant injunctions to prevent patent violations). 
 174. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 239 (2011). 
 175. See Chien, supra note 91, at 172. 
 176. FED. TRADE COMM’N supra note 174, at 240 (quoting Certain 
Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, No. 337-TA-543, slip op. at 62–63 n.230 
(Int’l Trade Comm’n, June 19, 2007) (second alteration in original)). 
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place of an injunction.177 As explained by Judge Posner, 
oftentimes in domestic SEP cases, monetary damages are the 
more appropriate remedy.178 Patent misuse is also available as 
an equitable defense in federal court permitting a defendant to 
allege the owner of a RAND-encumbered patent is misusing it 
if the owner fails to license on RAND terms.179 If the court 
agrees the SEP is being misused, the court can suspend the 
patentee’s ability to enforce its patent.180 This defense is not 
available at the ITC as the Commission has explicitly rejected 
the patent misuse defense along with other affirmative 
defenses of license, estoppel, and contract.181
D. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE 
REMEDIES 
 Because of the 
many complicated public policy issues at stake in domestic SEP 
disputes, the additional remedies and defenses available in 
federal court are critical to resolving the matter in a fashion 
that maximizes the benefit to the U.S. economy and consumers. 
With the shortcomings of the ITC’s ability to handle 
domestic SEP cases evident, several solutions have been 
proposed. Some argue that the ITC needs to focus on the third 
and fourth factors in eBay, balancing the hardships between 
the two companies and determining whether the public interest 
would be served by preventing the infringing product from 
reaching the marketplace.182 However, the ITC has consistently 
refused to apply eBay, and as a result, it does not have the 
extensive experience that federal courts do in conducting the 
careful balancing called for by the eBay test. In addition, given 
the ITC’s purpose, the eBay balancing is arguably not 
appropriate for ITC investigations involving international 
infringers for which the ITC’s strict enforcement mechanisms 
are well-tailored.183
                                                                                 
 177. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 
 Others have advocated for amending 
Section 337 to redefine “domestic industry” as excluding non-
3, at 78 n.1 (prepared statement of 
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
 178. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914–15 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (discussing the application of injunctive relief and noting that neither 
party was entitled to it in this SEP case). 
 179. See Lim, supra note 8, at 559–60. 
 180. Id. at 582. 
 181. See Certain Wireless Commc’ns Equip., Articles Therein, & Prods. 
Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-577, 2006 WL 2925369, at *1 (Int’l 
Trade Comm’n Oct. 3, 2006). 
 182. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 577. 
 183. See infra Part III. 
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manufacturing patentees to prevent ITC suits by foreign 
companies that purchase patents but do not manufacture or 
sell the product.184 However, this solution does not go far 
enough to remedy the situation for the benefit of American 
consumers and industry because not all domestic SEP cases 
would be covered under the proposed revisions. Still others 
have said the ITC should more frequently use the public 
interest analysis already outlined in Section 337.185 But this 
solution gives too much discretion to the ITC. Exclusion orders 
and the threat of exclusion orders are being used in ways that 
Congress did not intend when creating the ITC or revising its 
responsibilities, yet the ITC has consistently refused to exercise 
the public interest analysis to prevent outcomes that could 
significantly hinder competition and industries in America. 
Similarly, Chien and Lemley have recently proposed a number 
of ways the ITC can exercise the discretion found in its 
statutory scheme to prevent undesirable outcomes, such as 
delays in implementing exclusion orders, changes in how long 
companies may import excluded products if they post a bond, 
and better shaping of remedies for infringement.186 For SEP 
cases where exclusion orders are inappropriate,187 there is no 
need or reason to rely on the hope that the ITC will simply 
better exercise its discretion. Congressional action is needed to 
change the situation rather than hoping the ITC will reverse 
decades of precedent on its own. Finally, some proposals have 
looked to changes in the standard setting process to prevent 
patent holdups in the first place.188 This approach could be 
unwieldy, though, as SSOs are largely self-governing. Getting 
the countless SSOs across industries and across the globe to act 
in concert would be near impossible.189
                                                                                 
 184. See Allison, supra note 
 The result would be a 
patchwork of standard setting processes that would never 
172, at 882. 
 185. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 102 (prepared statement of 
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) 
(arguing that the public interest factors contained in Section 337 should be 
given special attention). 
 186. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 135, at 33–43. 
 187. Indeed, Chien and Lemley argue that exclusion orders are generally 
not appropriate in SEP cases. Id. at 41. 
 188. See Lim, supra note 8, at 566–67 (reporting methods that have been 
considered, including “rules generated and enforced by SSO members,” 
equitable estoppel, and implied waiver). 
 189. Cf. id. at 568–70 (discussing the complexity of standard setting and 
noting the diversity of actors involved).  
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completely eliminate the issue. Therefore, a new solution 
properly tailored to the problem at hand is required. 
III.  CONGRESS SHOULD PROHIBIT DOMESTIC SEP 
CASES FROM REACHING THE ITC   
“Section 337 provides little detail regarding when exclusion 
orders should be denied and no guidance regarding when 
exclusion orders should be narrowed.”190 It is time for Congress 
to start giving the ITC some guidance. Because the ITC “is a 
creature of statute and is limited in its discretion to decide 
upon and issue relief,”191
The simple fact is the ITC is too constrained to handle SEP 
disputes between domestic companies. Patents exist to promote 
innovation.
 Congressional action is necessary to 
prohibit the ITC from hearing standard-essential patent 
disputes between domestic companies. 
192 In fact, introductions of new products and 
processes—the kind that are protected by patents—are 
responsible for 75 percent of the U.S. economy’s growth since 
World War II.193 The Supreme Court has also “consistently held 
that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation 
of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts.”194 In addition, strong 
arguments can be made that the patent system is designed to 
promote consumer welfare.195 Together, these varying public 
interests require a careful balancing act between protecting 
innovation and creating a barrier to it.196
                                                                                 
 190. Kumar, supra note 
 Nowhere is the 
balancing more difficult than domestic SEP cases where 
domestic companies are litigating over a patent for a 
standardized technology that is supposed to be licensed on 
RAND terms. These cases simply have too many moving pieces 
for the ITC’s all-or-nothing approach. They need the careful 
1, at 573. 
 191. Bartkowski & Langdon, supra note 2, at 9. 
 192. Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 
142, 142 (2010). 
 193. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 94 (prepared statement of 
Joseph F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 194. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
511 (1917) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 195. See Exclusion Orders, supra note 3, at 79 (prepared statement of 
Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (suggesting that patent 
protection promotes consumer welfare by stimulating the creation of new, 
better, lower-cost products and processes). 
 196. See id. 
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balancing which Section 337 does not enable the ITC to 
consider. 
In contrast, the federal courts have the tools to address 
these domestic SEP cases. Requiring domestic SEP cases to be 
litigated in the federal courts would not dramatically increase 
the courts’ workload since almost 90 percent of ITC 
investigations have district court counterparts.197 Many cases 
litigated in both venues result in conflicting rulings,198 likely 
because the federal courts are able to take into account 
additional factors the ITC is statutorily barred from 
considering. “[B]y allowing parallel proceedings and indeed 
almost encouraging them, Congress has created the real 
possibility of inconsistent results between the [ITC] and district 
court proceedings.”199
Congress should remove the ITC’s jurisdiction to hear 
domestic SEP cases for another reason—exclusion orders are 
not an appropriate remedy in these cases. As Judge Posner has 
indicated, injunctions are not usually appropriate in domestic 
SEP cases,
 The simple solution is for Congress to 
pass legislation amending Section 337 to bar ITC jurisdiction 
over domestic SEP cases. 
200 and if an injunction is not appropriate, an 
exclusion order is not an appropriate remedy either. But, the 
ITC’s hands are tied. If the Commission finds the SEP has been 
infringed, it must issue an exclusion order. The ITC has also 
said that it is not necessary to show irreparable harm under 
Section 337.201
                                                                                 
 197. Cotropia, supra note 
 This is certainly the standard that should be 
required if the ITC is going to permit one domestic company to 
prevent another domestic company from importing its products 
into the United States. The risk of harm to consumers, 
industry, and the U.S. economy is too great for any other 
standard to be used. As a result, the ITC is simply not fit to 
resolve these cases, and Congress should amend Section 337 to 
remove ITC jurisdiction. Some may argue limiting access to 
exclusion orders could lessen the incentive for companies to 
innovate by removing one of their tools for protecting their 
intellectual property. In this sense, the approach advocated 
here would actually be worse for American industry and the 
87, at 24. 
 198. See Kumar, supra note 1, at 539. 
 199. Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001). 
 200. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914–18 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (discussing why injunctive relief is inappropriate in such a dispute). 
 201. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 174, at 240. 
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U.S. economy, but there is still a perfectly suitable remedy for 
domestic companies to protect their SEPs—federal court. While 
companies prefer the ITC because of its speedier resolutions202
Unlike other solutions, this approach is narrowly tailored 
to remove ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP cases while 
allowing the ITC to keep jurisdiction of international SEP 
cases. While it can be argued that exclusion orders are not 
appropriate in any SEP case, there should be more lenience 
when a foreign company is involved because of the difficulty of 
getting the infringing foreign company into federal court. Since 
the U.S. patent system’s principal purpose is to encourage 
innovation,
 
and the prospect of a total product ban, among other reasons, it 
is exactly those reasons that make ITC litigation such a danger 
to the U.S. economy in domestic SEP cases. In fact, ITC 
litigation in domestic SEP cases actually does more to hinder 
innovation than encourage it because of the threat it poses to 
the standards-setting system. In this sense, the approach 
advocated in this Note maximizes the benefits for the U.S. 
economy and American industry by removing a looming threat 
to innovation while leaving in place a more appropriate means 
of resolving these disputes—federal court—so as not to remove 
all intellectual property protection which would indeed 
discourage innovation. 
203 procedures need to be in place to prevent 
legitimately harmful patent infringement to preserve that 
incentive to innovate. Though monetary damages or a 
compulsory license may be the more appropriate remedy even 
in an international SEP case, the claimant may not be able to 
get effective relief in district court if the infringer is a foreign 
company. For instance, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., the court 
said U.S. patent laws do not apply to a foreign manufacturer 
that “does not itself [or through a legally related entity] import 
the allegedly infringing product into the United States.”204
                                                                                 
 202. See supra note 
 
However, the ITC would be able to issue an exclusion order 
that could stop these products at the border. The ITC’s 
authority to resolve SEP disputes should be maintained for 
situations like this. Domestic SEP cases do not involve these 
jurisdictional concerns though, so given overwhelming public 
interest against exclusion orders in these cases, the ITC should 
not be able to decide them. 
12 and accompanying text. 
 203. Leaffer, supra note 192, at 142. 
 204. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Aceto Corp., 853 F. Supp. 104, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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Admittedly, one challenge of this approach is properly 
defining “domestic company.” Establishing domicile, citizen-
ship, residence, and habitat of foreign corporations varies 
depending on the purpose and type of law, making an exact 
definition difficult to discern.205 Given the complexities, a firm 
definition is not established in this Note. Any definition should 
match the policy goals established for the ITC. Specifically, it 
should be tailored to protect American companies and the U.S. 
economy from being victimized by illegal trade practices by 
foreign companies. The simple answer appears to be limiting 
the definition to companies that are legally organized in the 
United States.206 However, this could be easily circumvented by 
foreign companies establishing wholly owned subsidiaries in 
America. Therefore, it would seem that the definition of 
domestic company should exclude companies organized in the 
United States that are wholly owned subsidiaries of companies 
organized outside the United States. The problem with this 
definition is that some wholly owned subsidiaries, such as 
Samsung Electronics America and Samsung Semiconductor, 
Inc., are essentially full-fledged companies in and of 
themselves.207 Rather than simply a legal means of funneling 
profits back to Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. in South Korea, 
these subsidiaries employ many Americans and engage in 
significant research and development here in the United 
States.208
                                                                                 
 205. See 17 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8300 (2006) (explaining the various aspects with 
respect to domicile, citizenship, residence, and habitat of foreign corporations). 
 The existence of these types of wholly owned 
subsidiaries that contribute substantially to the U.S. economy 
seems to argue for the inclusion of some wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, but careful line drawing 
would be needed to determine whether the subsidiary’s 
contribution to the U.S. economy and industry is significant 
enough to match the ITC’s policy aims of protecting the 
domestic economy and industry and thus earn exemption from 
 206. See 8 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS § 4025, at 453 (2010) (“[T]he legal existence, the home, the 
domicile, the habitat, the residence, and the citizenship of the corporation is 
generally deemed to be in the state by which it was created.”). 
 207. About Samsung, SAMSUNG, http://www.samsung.com/us/ 
aboutsamsung/samsung_electronics/us_divisions/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 208. Cf. id. (describing the wide variety of activities taking place in 
Samsung’s wholly owned subsidiaries that have their headquarters in the 
United States). 
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being subject to ITC jurisdiction in SEP disputes.209
The approach advocated in this Note of removing domestic 
SEP cases from ITC jurisdiction while still permitting 
international SEP cases is consistent with the ITC’s statutory 
purpose and legislative history—to protect domestic companies 
from illegal trade practices, especially if the ITC is the only 
means of doing so. The ITC has adjusted to major and minor 
statutory changes in the past.
 For all 
these reasons, the most appropriate definition of “domestic 
company” seems primed for further discussion in the future. 
210
  CONCLUSION   
 Therefore, Congress amending 
Section 337 to prohibit ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP 
cases would be just the latest in a string of necessary statutory 
revisions to keep the Commission consistent with its intended 
mission. 
As domestic companies increasingly turn to the ITC to 
settle disputes with fellow American companies over standard-
essential patent licensing, the likelihood increases that popular 
consumer electronics will be stopped at the border simply 
because they incorporate a technology necessary to comply with 
industry standards. Given the fact that the ITC must issue an 
exclusion order in these cases if it finds infringement, the ITC 
is unable to resolve these domestic SEP cases in a manner that 
is consistent with its protectionist legislative history and its 
statutory purpose to protect domestic industry. Solutions 
currently proposed are not appropriate because they are either 
too broad or are not guaranteed to remedy the issue in a 
manner that maximizes the benefit of American consumers and 
industry. However, if Congress amends Section 337 to prohibit 
ITC jurisdiction over domestic SEP disputes, these cases will be 
forced into the federal court system which has the tools to 
decide these cases appropriately and is familiar with handling 
cases where balancing the interests of the parties and the 
public good is required. At the same time, the ITC should 
remain a venue for international SEP cases because its unique 
procedures are well-tailored to offer domestic patent holders 
relief in these cases. This narrow tailoring will ensure the ITC 
                                                                                 
 209. This question is especially important in light of a recent high-profile 
case in which the Obama administration overturned an ITC exclusion order 
banning certain models of the iPhone, which was in Samsung’s favor. See 
Chen, supra note 79. 
 210. See Six Decades, supra note 145, at 269. 
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continues to prevent foreign companies from unfairly infringing 
on U.S. patents while protecting American consumers and 
industry—the primary purpose of the ITC. 
